Digital Commons at St. Mary's University
Faculty Articles

School of Law Faculty Scholarship

1996

Solidarity and Suffering: Toward a Politics of Relationality, by
Douglas Sturm (book review)
Emily A. Hartigan
St. Mary's University School of Law, ehartigan@stmarytx.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/facarticles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Emily Albrink Hartigan, Solidarity and Suffering: Toward a Politics of Relationality, by Douglas Sturm (book
review), 13 J.L. & Religion 249 (1996-98).

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law Faculty Scholarship at Digital
Commons at St. Mary's University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Articles by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information, please contact
sfowler@stmarytx.edu, jcrane3@stmarytx.edu.

BOOK REVIEW
SOLIDARITY AND SUFFERING: TOWARD A POLITICS OF RELATION-

ALITY. By Douglas Sturm. Albany, NY: State University of New

York Press, 1998. Pp. 335. $65.50. ISBN: 0791438694. Paper.
$21.95. ISBN: 0791438708.
Writing about something of Doug Sturm's is immediately a
relational undertaking. Before the first word is typed, Doug is ensconced in my imagination up in the back row, ready to ask the
first question, as he was the first time I met him at a Symposium on
Law, Religion and Ethics at Hamline Law School. He finds the
fulcrum point of the most interesting paradox in your presentation,
and balancing on it like one of those clowns on a unicycle, he proceeds to set first one, then two, then three... ideas spinning. Then
he asks a question out of the midst of his piercingly clear spirals,
smiling and eager for the nourishment of genuine interaction.
With such a formidable presence in my internal textual audience,
how can I begin? Yet how can I resist?
I will try both clarity and a backspin: Douglas Sturm in this
latest book reveals himself as almost predictable. Who among his
readers has not known he was a socialist, a feminist, a wellrounded, intellectually acute, politically active, spiritual troublemaker? Here he is again in the guise of the knowledgeable scholar
forever moving to include more: more spirit, more people, more
difference, more tension, more justice, and now more rocks and
trees. His movement of inclusion draws the reader always outside
the framework of the conventions of discourse he last inhabited.
Yet something about that movement itself has an integral, almost
definable theme, a theme of relation and connection permeating
the incisive distinctions his fine mind navigates for us. For example, if we look back to Community and Alienation,' his rich essays
on process thought and public life published in 1988, we find the
usual suspects. Chapter three, entitled "Identifying Problems of
Public Order," carries that book's subtext in its chapter subtitle:
"A Relational Approach."2 Sprinkled throughout that earlier
1. Douglas Sturm, Community and Alienation.: Essays on Process Thought and Public

Life (U Notre Dame Press, 1988).
2. Id at 52.
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book are Whitehead and process thought, and the tell-tale doctrine
of internal relAtions. For Sturm, relations are always internal to
their terms, always unalienated, always connected to the real stuff
of each person connected in the cosmos, and the cosmos is one of
love so trenchant that Sturm uses its name*with wise parsimony
and undeniable grace. Community and Alienation is an invitation
to a public order of covenant, inclusion, and prophetic naming of
public ills. It is woven of rich reflection, considerable authorial
verve, comprehensive scholarly learning, engagement with the
most recent writings of peers. So, what has changed?
Once again, in this newest tome, Solidarity and Suffering,
Sturm is sensitive to the feminine insights of contemporary women
scholars. He is again solicitous of the social nature of the individual. He is again versed in the most recent as well as classical religious and political texts. He plays on our interconnections, conceives of us as engaged in a communal activity of polity-weaving,
and brings the resonance of the spirit to the fore in the dialogue
into which he enters with zest. No one is excluded, in conception
or voice, for long. But these things have always been true of
Douglas Sturm's writing.
There are changes, if subtle ones, beyond his inclusion of the
non-human figures of creation, an intensified ecological relationality. In addition to an ever-widening sense of the threads among all
created beings, I suggest that in this text we find the tell-tale signs
that Sturm is getting harder and softer in his old age. He is even
more obnoxious about the extent of our aberrations, our human
failings. He puts the faces and the statistics of the neglected children of the "two-thirds" world to the fore, centering his song on
the suffering of innocents. He is without mercy for the reader,
planting narrative and fact and numbers in the forefront of the
text. But he has also begun to make even more manifest in his
newest text, Solidarity and Suffering, the extent of the outrageous
love and "interbeing" which points to redemption. He "outs" his
familiar, favorite "philosophical doctrine of internal relations" and
tells us it comes to this: "in the depth of our being, we belong to
each other." (16)'
In any other academic text, "we belong to each other" in the
"depth of our being" would risk falling into song lyric and nervous
smiles. But Douglas Sturm has a lived testimony that reverberates
3.

All citations in the text refer to the book under review.
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among his peers, a life- text which supports such statements. This
testimony was visible even in a several-day symposium peopled by
a bank of male scholars; I recall such a gathering at DePaul University Law School in Chicago, where Douglas Sturm was the only
speaker to use inclusive language, to invite women to share his text
and the conversation openly. The meeting was on church and
state, and the usual crew was there; Stanley Hauerwas' hour and a
half without mentioning one woman was typical. Doug did not notice and then correct, he did not wait until the issue was named.
He had from his first sentence, as a matter of exquisitely sensitive
practice, modulated his vocabulary to demonstrate that he was
structurally aware of the need to address and include Others. In
the current book as in prior writing, Sturm weaves into the matrix
of his text, the voices and writings of women, often pointing to
them as sources of the great insight that only Outsiders may be relied upon to contribute. Thus it is hardly surprising that he includes in'Solidarity and Suffering those creatures never seen at an
academic conference rostrum: children. More, these are voiceless,
dirty, ragged, sick children, the sort that tap an immediate instinct
to deny and forget, lest we be driven crazy by our eternal complicity.
Sturm manifests our interrelatedness with these helpless suffering fellow humans; the corollary to his "we belong to each
other" means that they are in us and we are in them.., and that is
good news. The abstract doctrine of that, the one that serves as a
leitmotif through Sturm's writings, is the doctrine of internal relations. I remember being intrigued by the issue as an undergrad
philosophy major, and writing a long, convoluted paper about why
relations were internal to their terms, rather than external to them.
I was rather startled when one of the other philosophy professors
remarked that most of the "best" students of a visiting prof the
year before (of which I was supposedly one) would come to the
same conclusion. In that relentlessly secular program of philosophy, the Catholic visitor had slipped us a monism that made the internal nature of relations "obvious" to us... without ever mentioning God. But his view, like Sturm's, was so thorough goingly
grounded in God's reality that no other cosmos was possible, even
if the vehicle was Wittgenstein before the academy could admit
that Wittgenstein used the "M" word (mystic). Wittgenstein, too,
thrums with internal relations. We belong to each other, we make
each other in our talk, in our culture, in our language games, both
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Wittgenstein and Sturm chant in the threads of their texts.
The virtuoso combination of such high abstraction and spirit,
with gritty suffering and politics in a world of violence, simultaneously grounds Sturm's text and sends it winging. He composes a
series of epigrams which punctuate the text into a manifesto-like
exhortation, but they themselves are in process. Rather than modeling the didactic propositions of an imperative text, these musings
contain the very process of ongoing thought and reflection that
Sturm advocates: [u]nderstandingin the absence of compassion is
not only morally irresponsible;it results, as well, in a constricted,
nay, a distortedform of understanding.(224, emphasis in original)
Refashioning the thought as it comes into writing, Sturm
points the reader to the emphatic difference between mere constriction and distortion of the form itself. This is compassion, the
necessary ingredient of understanding, transforming the very
grammar of the sentence in which it is embedded, manifesting the
generative process itself. Such movement is the hallmark of a true
text, one so integral that an inexact word, recrafted, illustrates and
then transcends its own limitations. Such textual dynamism is
Sturm's modus operandi, both in conversation and in writing. Not
satisfied with a sense of justice that would give some justice and
food to the children whom he invokes at the outset, Sturm calls for
a justice that "is expressive of a communal cosmology" and which
"generates visions of a new social world." (160) Rather than attempting a social contractarian vision of mutual acceptability, of
minimal self-binding to avert a life "nasty, brutish and short,"
Sturm imagines a movement, an animating spirit that would continue to give new birth to visions. His idea of justice is alive, as is
his text.
The very vivacity of the text, the animation Sturm brings to
writing, create a discourse that can sustain the considerable weight
of suffering which he presents to the reader. He also conveys
rather than merely pointing a theoretical finger at that most elusive
virtue, hope, without which an account of suffering becomes an unredeemed authorial self-indulgence. I was reminded of William
Stringfellow's contemplation of pain in the final pages of The Politics of Spirituality, written while he was dying painfully of multiple
ailments.4 Stringfellow talks of mystery, and then locates pain in
4. William Stringfellow, The Politics of Spirituality: Spirituality and the Christian Life
(Westminster Press, 1984).
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intercession (he has already differentiated pain from punishment,
freed it from guilt), and connects it to us all: "[p]ain is intercessory:
one is never alone in pain but is always a surrogate of everyone
else who hurts--which is categorically everybody."' Thus whether
we are connected by the solidarity of our own suffering or by the
solidarity of empathetic suffering, we are, in suffering, connected.
But is it better in some sense to be connected through compassion, rather than through the challenge of our personal suffering? Is deep empathy more trustworthy than the risky psychological terrain of our own wounds? This is, I suspect, a false
dichotomy. Knowledge of our own internal landscape is a necessary face of our compassion for the Other. With his intense commitment to the public life, Sturm echoes Socrates' valuation of the
examined life-- "From the time of birth to the time of death, the
richness of our lives in contingent on the depth and extent of the
dialogic interactions in which we have been engaged" (184)-but
reveals, I suspect, a lingering male perspectival dominance. That
is, he conceives of the dialogue as external, public, political. I
would not assume that he might not count the kaffeeklatsch as a
locus of dialogue, that he might not value the talk among traditional women as constitutive of community. Thus would not Sturm
find of commensurate value with the Academy and its talk, the internal dialogue, the life of the introverted person (disproportionately female) who talks not to the outside Other, but to the internal figures in her reflective life? What woman does not have an
introjected Patriarch all too available for silent conversation? Perhaps the sort of external dialogue in conventional "publics" to
which Sturm refers is the luxury of the entitled. Socrates was a
citizen, a male, a free man, in a state in which women, resident aliens, slaves, were all disenfranchised. Perhaps the call Sturm makes
is best aimed at the privileged. It is not Doug Sturm's doing that
the readers of his books will be mostly the highly educated, Anglo,
even disproportionately male, among all those making homes in
the territory of the United States. Thus his call to acknowledge
connection is peculiarly appropriate to those most likely to read it.
This demonstrates his inherently subversive presence, even for
those who do not know how he sits in the back of the room at conferences-listening, waiting, poised to ask the question that will
move the talk into the next paradox, into the next space of mys5. Id at 90.
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tery, into the unresolved space of true conversation. We are much
richer for knowing that he perches with full knowledge of the
depth of suffering, with the very mechanism I name as not entirely
validated in his book at work in him: always questioning-and interrogating Douglas Sturm most deeply of all. What a gift it is
when he makes that movement of inquiry public, ranging among
texts, asking us as readers how we know ourselves to be connected.
And the font of his questioning, like the source of his writing, is so
clearly one of love that it answers as it interrogates.
Emily Albrink Hartigan'

t Professor of Law, Saint Mary's University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas.

